The Macroeconomics of Model T by Foellmi, Reto et al.
 
 
 
 
 
Institute for Empirical Research in Economics 
University of Zurich 
 
Working Paper Series 
ISSN 1424-0459 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 459 
The Macroeconomics of Model T 
Reto Foellmi, Tobias Wuergler and Josef Zweimüller 
December 2009 
 
 
The Macroeconomics of Model T
Reto Foellmi, University of Berne and CEPR
Tobias Wuergler, University of Zurichy
Josef Zweimüller, University of Zurich and CEPRzx
December 3, 2009
Abstract
We study a model of endogenous growth where rms invest both in product and process
innovations. Product innovations (that open up completely new product lines) satisfy the
advanced wants of the rich. Subsequent process innovations (that decrease costs per unit
of quality) transform the luxurious products of the rich into conveniences of the poor. A
prototypical example for such a product cycle is the automobile. Initially an exclusive
product for the very rich, the automobile became a¤ordable to the middle class after
the introduction of Fords Model T, the car that "put America on wheels". We show
that an egalitarian society creates strong incentives for process innovations (such as the
Model T) whereas an unequal society creates strong incentives for product innovations
(new luxuries). We show that the inequality-growth relationship depends on which type of
innovative activity drives technical progress, analyzing both the characteristics of and the
transition to the balanced growth path.
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"Consumer goods inventions that cut both cost and quality but reduce the for-
mer more than the latter, such as the Model T, have historically been an important
means for transforming the luxuries of the rich into the conveniences of the poor."
Jacob Schmookler, Invention and Economic Growth (1966)
1 Introduction
This paper develops a model of endogenous growth based on a cycle of product and process
innovations. Product innovations introduce new goods satisfying the advanced wants of rich
consumers. Process innovations lead to the adoption of new production processes that reduce
the cost per unit of quality, making the goods also a¤ordable to the poorer classes. As empha-
sized by Schmookler (1966), such a cycle of product and process innovations has historically
been important to transform the luxuries of the rich into mass consumption markets.
The automobile, one of the most important durable goods in modern industrial societies,
provides a prototypical example for such an innovation cycle. In the United States, the history
of the commercial automobile production started with Charles and Frank Duryea who founded
the Duryea Motor Wagon Company in 1893, the rst American automobile manufacturing
company; in 1902 and 1903 Oldsmobile (by Ransom E. Olds Company) and Cadillac (by
Henry Ford Company) followed. At the time, the automobile was a luxury good consumed
only by very rich households. Things started to change in 1908, when Ford introduced the
Model T , the car that "put America on wheels". The concept was the use of assembly lines
to produce a low-cost, low-quality car a¤ordable to the middle class. Model T became a huge
success and initiated the takeo¤ in car ownership in the U.S. Between 1908 and 1927 more
than 15 million units of Model T were manufactured. The introduction of Model T contributed
crucially to the fast di¤usion of the automobile in the U.S.1
Product cycles where a new invention created a luxury good for the rich and subsequent
innovations turned the luxury into a mass consumption good for lower classes are not conned
to the auto industry. It has been important for many other consumer durables such as the
refrigerator, the radio, the TV, and the computer, showing very similar patterns of innovation
cycles.
We develop a formal endogenous growth model where rms engage both in product and
process innovations of indivisible consumption goods. These indivisibilities let the composition
of demand by rich consumers systematically di¤er from that of poorer households. The rich do
not only purchase a larger variety of consumption goods, but also do consume these goods in
better quality. Poorer households consume only a fraction of the available varieties and prefer
1Encyclopaedia Britannica
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lower qualities to higher ones. Income inequality thus shapes product cycles and generates
substantially di¤erent incentives for product and process innovation. Put di¤erently, inequality
determines the direction of technical change. Whereas an egalitarian society creates strong
incentives for process innovations (such as the Model T), an unequal society creates strong
incentives for product innovations (new luxuries).
Our analysis shows how the growth process and the associated mix of product and process
innovations depend on the interaction between two major forces: the particular source of tech-
nical progress; and the extent of economic inequality in a society. If technical progress is mainly
driven by product innovations, inequality is benecial for long-run growth. Rising inequalities
allow innovators to charge high prices both during the early period when the product is intro-
duced as well as during the later period when the new product has generated mass markets but
is still available in high quality and at a high price that the rich but not the poor are willing
to pay. In contrast, if technical progress is mainly driven by process innovations, the relation-
ship between inequality and growth is turned upside down and inequality becomes harmful
for long-run growth. When the large majority of households is extremely poor, there is little
potential to open up mass consumption markets and hence investments in low-quality low-
cost process innovations are weak. In the presence of complementarities between process and
product innovations, the relationship between inequality and growth becomes hump-shaped.
Complementarities imply that an economy which has invested relatively little in process inno-
vation is likely to benet more from process innovations and vice versa. In that case, both very
high levels and very low levels of inequality are harmful for growth, and growth is maximized
at an intermediate extent of economic inequality.
Our analysis does not only characterize the balanced growth path of such an economy but
also the transitional dynamics towards this path. Transitional dynamics reveal that both de-
mand and supply shocks may trigger periods of industrial change in which a series of process
innovations increases production and access to consumption markets. A large drop in inequal-
ity (such as the one that followed the Great Depression and WWII) triggers an initial phase
where innovation activity is purely directed towards process innovations that facilitate mass
production, while product innovation temporarily stops. Hence our model provides an ex-
planation for the boom in consumer durables in the U.S. (and other industrialized countries)
in the post-war era. A positive productivity shock lowering the costs of process innovation
triggers an industrial revolution where an initially stagnant economy of craftsmanship and
highly exclusive production is transformed into a modern society with broad participation and
growth. We show that inequality while initially benecial for growth in the exclusive society
may eventually become harmful for growth after the economy has run through the transition
phase and the economy has become a mass consumption society. In particular, our analysis
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predicts that in early stages of development (before the introduction of mass production tech-
nologies) inequality is benecial for growth because technical progress is mainly driven by the
introduction of new products for which the rich are willing to pay high prices. In later stages
of development (after the introduction of mass production technologies) growth is higher in
more egalitarian societies because process innovations become important drivers for growth.
To generate the incentives for adopting these technologies, large markets and a high purchasing
power of the lower classes are prerequisites.2
Our analysis extends the existing literature in at least three dimensions. First, our paper
is related to the literature on directed technical change (Acemoglu, 1998 and 2002, Acemoglu
and Zilibotti, 2001, and others). This literature analyzes the forces that generate biases in
technical change towards one particular production factor. Similar to our paper, directed
technical change models emphasize the tension between price and market size e¤ects. However,
the emphasis is on the relative demand for production factors, i.e. the supply/cost side of the
economy. In contrast, our model focuses on demand/income e¤ects. This channel generates
an important role for the distribution of income across households, a mechanism that is absent
in directed technical change models.
Second, our paper highlights the distinct role that product and process innovations can
play in the process of long-run growth. In this dimension our paper di¤ers from the large
literature on the determinants of the aggregate technical progress (Romer 1990, Aghion and
Howitt, 1992, Grossman and Helpman 1991, etc.). Aggregate models of product and process
innovations are often mathematically similar (Acemoglu, 2009), that is the source of technical
change is not essential to answer the question of what factors inuence economic growth. This
is di¤erent in our framework where incentives for product inventions and process innovations
are subject to systematic di¤erences, in particular with respect to the extent of inequality in
the society.
Third, we speak to a small literature that has studied the impact of income inequality on
technical progress. Matsuyama (2002) demonstrates the virtuous cycle between learning-by-
doing and a large middle class, enabling the Flying Geese pattern discussed later in our paper.
Foellmi and Zweimüller (2006) focus on product inventions and the scope of innovatorsprice
setting power in the presence of a wealthy upper class. The present paper can be viewed as
a synthesis of these classes of models. Our analysis highlights the conditions under which an
unequal society su¤ers from lack of process innovations (and/or learning-by-doing) and from a
small range of mass markets. Our analysis also makes precise the conditions under which such
2 In Galor and Moav (2004, 2006) the inequality-growth relationship also changes across stages of development.
Due to non-homothetic preferences over consumption and bequests, inequality leads to higher growth in early
stages of development and to lower growth in later stages.
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a society benets from large mark-ups and high incentives to open up completely new product
lines.3
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 analyzes empirical and historical evidence
motivating the key assumptions and mechanisms of our model. Section 3 introduces the formal
framework, section 4 presents the solution of the balanced growth equilibrium, and section
5 discusses the relationship between inequality and growth. Section 6 studies transitional
dynamics. We conclude with a summary and a list of potential extensions to our framework.
2 Motivating evidence
Casual observations and empirical evidence suggest that there is a strong impact of income
on the number of varieties purchased by households, which is at odds with homothetic prefer-
ences.4 Figure 1 illustrates this point by exhibiting the shares of ownership of various consumer
durables of urban Chinese households (National Bureau of Statistics of China). At any given
point in time, most types of consumer durables are only consumed by a fraction of the house-
holds. The gure also shows that levels of penetration rise over time. This is what Matsuyama
(2002) calls the "Flying Geese pattern", in which a series of products takes o¤ one after an-
other, following an increase in productivity and income. This gradual increase in penetration
levels was rst emphasized by Katona (1964) who observed that the mass consumption society
is the last stage of a process in which former luxury goods, consumed only by a few, privileged
households, have been transformed into necessities for most households (i.e. mass consumption
goods). Many products such as cars, radios, television sets, washing machines, refrigerators,
vacuum cleaners and, more recently, computers have gone through such product cycles in the
developed world, and are presently going through similar cycles in developing countries. Be-
sides plain income e¤ects, key elements of such product cycles are process innovations that cut
the costs of production su¢ ciently. After a product has been invented, initial manufacturing
costs are usually quite high, and sales volumes linger as the good can only be a¤orded by a
few rich households. The takeo¤ and subsequent proliferation of the product is often ignited
3Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) study the role of income distribution on technology adoption in a static
context. Falkinger (1994) develops a model where inequality a¤ects technical progress via aggregate output of
consumer goods. The e¤ect of inequality on technical progress in quality ladder models is explored in Li (2003)
and Zweimüller and Brunner (2006).
4Jackson (1984) nds that the richest income class consumed twice as many di¤erent goods as the poorest
class, using micro data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Falkinger
and Zweimueller (1996) generate similar results using aggregate cross-country data from the International Com-
parison Project of the UN on per-capita expenditure levels on ninety-one di¤erent consumption categories.
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and enabled by a series of process innovations that reduce manufacturing costs signicantly.5
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Figure 1: Ownership of consumer durables in Urban Chinese households (National Bureau of
Statistics of China)
As mentioned above, one of the most famous historical examples for such an innovation
pattern is the Ford Model T. It is generally regarded as the rst a¤ordable automobile, the car
that "put America on wheels". One major reason behind the huge success story of Model T
were Fords innovations, including assembly line production instead of individual hand crafting,
as well as the concept of paying the workers a wage proportionate to the cost of the car, so
that they would provide a ready made market. Both innovations led to a huge increase in
productivity. In total, Ford manufactured more than 15 million Model Ts from 1908 to 1927,
which contributed critically to the fast di¤usion of the automobile. Figure 2 shows automobile
and truck registrations in the U.S. from 1900 to 1970. The number of car registrations took
o¤ in the period of the Model T, and reached 23 million in 1927. Whereas 1% of households
in the U.S. owned a car in 1908, the hour of birth of the Model T, penetration reached 50% in
1924.6
The product cycle that led to the Model T is not specic to the U.S. but can be observed
in other parts of the world. Most of the large European economies had their own Model T
which brought the car to the people. In Germany, a "peoples car" Volkswagen ("Beetle")
was initially introduced in the 1930s (and fostered by the Nazi regime). Citroën7, Fiat and
5Our analysis highlights the relevance of major product and process innovations that create new product
lines and subsequent mass consumption goods. Notice that in reality both mass consumption goods and luxury
goods are continuously improved in quality. While this is clearly of high relevance in practice, we abstract from
continuous quality improvements in our framework.
6See Model T Facts on media.ford.com, Encyclopaedia Britannica, and Bowden and O¤er (1994) for pene-
tration levels.
7Citroën director Pierre-Jules Boulangers early design brief for the 2CV supposedly asked for "a vehicle
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Figure 2: Automobile and truck registrations in the US in 1000 units (US Census)
Austin 7 brought the car to the people of France, Italy and the UK, respectively. In rich
countries, the introduction of mass-produced cars was an important step in the history of
the manufacturing industry. And what has been important for rich countries in the past is
starting to become relevant in poorer countries today. In Asia for example, Tata has recently
announced to produce the worlds cheapest car, mainly for the Indian market. The following
table provides an overview of the worlds major "Model Ts":
Country Model Year of introduction
US Ford Model T 1908
UK Austin 7 1922
Italy Fiat 500 Topolino & Nouva 1936
Germany VW Käfer (Beetle) 1938
France Citroën 2CV 1949
Japan Subaru 360 1958
India Tata Nano 2009
The auto industry is an example for the types of innovation and product cycles that our
model aims to capture. While it provided the prototypical example, there are many other goods
that experienced very similar patterns of innovation and market expansion. Two centuries af-
ter articial refrigeration was pioneered by Dr. William Cullen, a GE home refrigerator cost
around 700$ in 1922, compared to 450$ for a 1922 Ford Model T. Penetration barely reached
capable of transporting two peasants in boots, 100 pounds of potatoes or a barrel of wine, at a maximum speed
of 40 mph, [...] Its price should be well below the one of our Traction Avant and, nally, its appearance is of
little importance." (Translation, Technologie SCEREN - CNDP no. 138, 2005)
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1% in the U.S. in 1925. The introduction of freon expanded the refrigerator market during the
1930s, with penetration reaching 50% by 1938. Refrigerators went into mass production after
WWII, and by the year 1948 75% of all households owned a fridge.8 The history of television
started with rst experimental transmissions made by Charles Jenkins in 1923. Television
usage in the U.S. exploded after WWII. Having reached a penetration of 1% in 1948, it only
took 5 years to reach 50%, and 2 more years to reach 75%. The rapid di¤usion was enabled
by the lifting of the manufacturing freeze, war-related technological advances, the expansion
of the television networks, the drop in television prices enabled by mass production and ad-
ditional disposable income.9 A very similar evolution can be traced for computers. Spurred
by calculation requirements for ballistics and decryption during WWII, the rst electronic
digital computers were developed between 1940-1945. Developments of the microprocessor led
to the proliferation of the personal computer after about 1975. Mass market pre-assembled
computers allowed a wider range of people to use computers, and penetration reached 1% in
the U.S. around 1980. Component prices continued to fall since then, leading to continuous
price declines. Penetration reached 50% around 2000. The emergence of Netbooks in 2007,
a new market segment of small, energy-e¢ cient ultra low-cost devices, is likely to advance
penetration signicantly, especially in developing countries.10
These examples demonstrate how closely process innovations and mass consumption mar-
kets are intertwined: Process innovations reducing manufacturing costs are crucial elements
for tapping and proliferating mass consumption markets. Mass production, in turn, facili-
tates process innovation by increasing learning-by-doing and specialization benets. We have
established a close connection between inequality, product and process innovation. Product in-
novations introduce new goods satisfying the advanced wants of rich households who consume
a wider range of goods than poorer households. Subsequent process innovations adopt manu-
facturing processes that reduce costs per unit of quality, making the products also a¤ordable
to poorer classes. Higher inequality raises the purchasing power of rich households, increasing
demand for variety and product innovation. A more egalitarian society, on the other hand,
raises the number of mass consumption markets and thus incentives for process innovation.
Comparing the experience of Japan and the U.S. over the last decades provides suggestive
evidence: Income concentration in Japan has remained relatively low after WWII in contrast
to the U.S. (Moriguchi and Saez, 2005). During the same period of time, Japan has made itself
8Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers, "The Story of the Refrigerator;" Bowden and O¤er (1994)
9Steven Schoenherr, "History of Television," History Server of University of San Diego; Bowden and O¤er
(1994)
10Je¤rey Shallit, "A Very Brief History of Computer Science," University of Waterloo; W. Warner, "Great
Moments in Microprocessor History," Technical Library IBM; "Computer Use and Ownership," U.S. Census,
and authorsestimates
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a name as country of lean production and just-in-time management, i.e. process innovation. A
recent study by Nagaoka and Walsh (2009), using data from the RIETI-Georgia Tech inventor
survey, indeed shows that R&D in Japan is more biased to process innovation, in contrast to
the U.S. where it is more directed to product innovation.
3 The model
3.1 The distribution of endowments
We assume there are L households that inelastically supply L units of labor. L households
are poor (indexed by P ) and (1  )L are rich (indexed by R). Income di¤erences arise from
two sources. First, households are unequally endowed with units of labor. A poor household
is endowed with `P = ` < 1 labor units, and the labor endowment of a rich household is
`R = (1  `) = (1  ) > 1.11 The parameters  and ` fully characterize the distribution
of labor endowments. The corresponding Lorenz-curve is piecewise linear with slope ` for
population shares between 0 and ; and slope (1  `)=(1  ) for population shares between
 and 1: Notice that common measures of inequality (such as the Gini coe¢ cient and the
coe¢ cient of variation) indicate an increase in inequality when ` falls and/or  rises. It is
assumed that the distribution of labor endowments is constant over time.
The second source of income di¤erences is due to inequality in wealth, based on ownership
in monopolistic rms. We denote by v(t) the per-capita value of these rms at date t and
assume that a poor household owns wealth vP (t) = v(t)v(t) and a rich household owns wealth
vR(t) = [(1  v(t)) =(1  )] v(t) where v(t) < 1 and (1  v(t)) =(1   ) > 1. In analogy
to the labor endowment distribution, the distribution of wealth is determined by  and v(t).
Unlike the labor endowment distribution, however, the wealth distribution can change over
time since vP (t) and vR(t) are endogenously determined by householdssavings decisions. In
sections 4 and 5 below we will study balanced growth paths. Along such paths, all households
have the same savings rates and the wealth distribution is stationary, v(t) = v for all t.
When we analyze balanced growth paths below we will assume ` = v = . While this is
clearly a rather special case, it keeps the analysis simple and transparent. Allowing labor
endowment and wealth distributions to di¤er does not change the results in any economically
relevant way. For instance, in comparing steady states, it does not make a di¤erence whether
the resulting incomes di¤erences arise due to an unequal labor endowment distribution, due to
an unequal wealth distribution, or both. What matters is inequality in total lifetime incomes.
However, when we study transitional dynamics in section 6, we have to account for the fact
11Since the average labor endowment per household is unity we must have `P + (1   )`R = 1. Setting
`P = ` we get `R = (1  `)=(1  ).
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that householdssavings rates need no longer be equal in the transition to a new steady state.
As the wealth distribution changes over time we have to abandon the assumption ` = v = 
and make the time-dependence of v(t) explicit.
3.2 Technology and technical progress
Labor is the only production factor, the labor market is competitive and the market clearing
wage is denoted by w(t). Production activities are undertaken in monopolistic rms that
supply di¤erentiated products and operate with an increasing returns-to-scale technology. The
creation of a rm requires a product innovation, i.e. an investment of ~F (t) units of labor that
yields the blueprint for a completely new product (e.g. the automobile). Once such a product
innovation has been made, the innovating rm obtains a patent of innite length granting the
exclusive right to market this product. We think of a product innovation as a luxury good that
initially satises the wants of rich households and that is costly in production. We assume a
new product has quality qh and requires a (high) labor input ~ah(t) per unit of output. After
a successful product innovation, the rm has the option to undertake a process innovation
that cuts both the quality of the product and its production cost. More precisely, we assume
that after a further investment of ~G(t) labor units, the product can also be supplied in lower
quality ql < qh and produced with a lower labor input ~al(t) < ~ah(t), the quality-cost ratio
is higher, however, ql=~al(t) > qh=~ah(t). This captures Schmooklers idea that mass consumer
good inventions cut both costs and quality but the former more than the latter. (Think of the
high quality as the Cadillac and of the low quality as the Model T.)
In what follows we will refer to rms that have incurred both the product and the process
innovation as "mass producers". Firms that have made only the product but not the process
innovation will be called "exclusive producers". (The term "exclusive" is suggestive in the sense
that it refers to both a high "exclusive" quality and to a situation where rms "exclude" the
poor from consumption by setting prices that only rich but not poor households can a¤ord.)12
Product and process innovations are the driving forces behind technical progress and long-
run growth. We assume that the (non-excludable, non-rival) aggregate stock of knowledge A(t)
is determined by past product innovations and past process innovations. Assuming that labor
requirements in the various activities are inversely related to the aggregate stock of knowledge
A(t) we have ~F (t) = F=A(t), ~ah(t) = ah=A(t), ~G(t) = G=A(t), and ~al(t) = al=A(t) where F ,
12Note that the way we use the terms "exclusive producers" and "mass producers" refers to access to tech-
nology rather than to quantity of production. It may be that a mass producer makes a higher prot by selling
only to the rich and a luxury producer may be better o¤ by selling to the rich and the poor. We will see that
such "strange" outcomes never happen along a balanced growth path but may be temporarily relevant during
transitions towards a new steady state (see section 6 below).
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G, ah, and al are exogenous, positive constants. We assume that A(t) is linked to past product
and process innovations via the CES-function
A(t) = [ N(t) + (1   )M(t) ]1= ; (1)
with  2 (0; 1) and  2 [0; 1]. N(t) denotes the range of product varieties and M(t) the
range of varieties that underwent process innovations. The linear homogeneity of knowledge
accumulation (1) satises the knife-edge condition for endogenous growth.13 Note also that
both R&D sectors benet equally from spillovers, corresponding to the basic case of no state
dependence in models of directed technical change (cf. Acemoglu, 2002).14
3.3 Preferences and consumer choices
Households have an innite horizon and choose consumption both within and across periods
to maximize lifetime utility. At a given point in time, a household chooses consumption from
the continuum of N(t) goods. Among the N(t) rms that exist at date t there are those that
made a product innovation but have not yet made a process innovation (exclusive producers);
and other rms that have made both the product and the process innovation (mass producers).
This means M(t) goods are supplied both in high and low quality and N(t) M(t) goods are
supplied in high quality only. In general, the prices may vary both across goods and across
qualities and may change over time. We denote the price of good j and quality q at date t by
p(j; q; t).
The crucial assumption adopted here is that goods are indivisible. More precisely, the
household has to decide whether or not to consume good j, and if yes, whether to consume
it in high or low quality. There are three outcomes: either a household consumes (i) one unit
in high quality, (ii) one unit in low quality, or (iii) does not consume at all. It turns out
that such a discrete specication of preferences is a simple and tractable way to introduce
non-homotheticities and to allow for a situation where rich households do not only consume
a broader menu of goods but also consume the purchased goods in higher quality. Denote by
xi(j; t) an indicator function that takes value 1 if household i consumes good j at date t, and
takes value 0 if not. Similarly, denote by qi(j; t) the chosen quality level which can take only
one of the two values fqh; qlg. The households objective function is given by
Ui() =
Z 1

log
"Z N(t)
0
xi(j; t)qi(j; t)dj
#
e (t ) dt
13The knowledge-driven specication is more simple and transparent in a setting with nal good varieties in
di¤erent qualities whereas a lab-equipment model yields formally equivalent results and does not add economic
substance.
14An extension of the model could study the role of state dependence, e.g. ~F (t) = F=N(t), ~ah(t) = ah=N(t),
~G(t) = G=M(t), and ~al(t) = al=M(t).
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where  is the rate of time preference. The term in brackets can be interpreted as an instanta-
neous consumption aggregator which, for later use, we denote by ci(t) 
Z N(t)
0
xi(j; t)qi(j; t)dj:
The consumer chooses the time paths of xi(j; t) and qi(j; t) so as to maximize the above lifetime
utility subject to the lifetime budget constraintZ 1

"Z N(t)
0
p(j; qi; t)xi(j; t)dj
#
e R(t;)dt 
Z 1

`iw(t)e
 R(t;)dt+ vi();
where R(t; ) =
R t
 r(s)ds is the cumulative discount factor between dates  and t, r(t) is the
interest rate, `i is the (time-invariant) labor endowment of household i, and vi() is the initial
wealth level owned by the household.
The rst-order conditions for the discrete consumption choice of good j are given by
fxi(j; t); qi(j; t)g =
8>>><>>>:
f1; qhg
f1; qlg
f0; g
if qhi(t)  p(j; qh; t)  max [0; qli(t)  p(j; ql; t)] ;
if qli(t)  p(j; ql; t)  max [0; qhi(t)  p(j; qh; t)] ;
otherwise,
(2)
where
i(t) = [ci(t)i(t)]
 1
is household is willingness to pay per unit of quality and i(t) the marginal utility of wealth
at date t. These rst order conditions are very intuitive. The condition in the rst line of
(2) says that good j will be consumed in high quality if the consumers willingness to pay for
the high quality qhi(t) is su¢ ciently larger than its price p(j; qh; t) so that both alternatives
(purchasing not at all and purchasing the low quality) lead to a worse outcome. In other
words, there needs to be a utility gain and it needs to be larger than the utility gain from
purchasing the low quality. Similarly, the consumer will purchase the low quality if there is
a utility gain that is larger than when purchasing the high quality. Otherwise, the household
does not consume good j at all.
3.4 Price setting and prots
Firms make their pricing decisions on the basis of market demand functions that derive from
householdsoptimal consumption choices given by the conditions in (2). Figure 3 shows the
market demand curves graphically, both for the high quality (panel a) and for the low quality
(panel b). Notice that the willingness to pay for quality k 2 fl; hg is always larger for a rich
household than for a poor household, qkR > qkP . (For simplicity, we omit time indices in
this section).
FIGURE 3
An exclusive producer can supply the product only in high but not in low quality. For such
a rm only panel a) of Figure 3 is relevant. When the rm charges a price below (or equal to)
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qhP both rich and poor households will purchase the good and market demand is L. When
the price is above qhP but below (or equal to) qhR only rich households purchase the good
and market demand is (1   )L. When the price is larger than qhR not even the rich are
willing to purchase and market demand is zero. The exclusive producer has essentially two
options: (i) set price qhR and sell to rich households only; or (ii) set price qhP and sell to
the whole customer base.
A mass producer can supply the good both in high and low quality. Such a rm faces
demand curves as drawn in panels a) and b) of Figure 3. Stricly speaking, the demand curve
for the high quality takes the form drawn in panel a) only if the low quality is not supplied.
Similarly, panel b) is only relevant if the high quality is not supplied. (This is because each
household consumes at most one unit.) To determine the optimal prices of a mass producer
we have to consider panels a) and b) simultaneously. The mass producer has in principle the
following options: (i) supply the low quality at price qlP and do not sell the high quality at
all; (ii) supply the low quality at price qlR and do not sell the high quality at all; (iii) supply
the high quality at price qhR and do not sell the low quality at all; or (iv) supply the high
quality at price qhP and do not sell the low quality at all.
Actually, the mass producer has a fth option and this option is the most interesting one
in the present context: (v) set price qlP for the low quality and sell it to poor households
and set price qlP + (qh   ql)R for the high quality and sell it to rich households. (This
means rich consumers still purchase the Cadillac-version of a new product even when a Model
T-version becomes available.) Notice that under this fth option the rm cannot fully exploit
the willingness to pay of rich consumers since they can switch to the low quality. To attract
the rich households as customers for the high quality, the rm needs to set a price that is
not larger than the price that makes a rich household indi¤erent between consuming the low
quality and consuming the high quality. From (2) it is straightforward to verify that, when the
low quality has price qlP , the highest price that induces the rich to purchase the high rather
than the low quality is qlP + (qh   ql)R. To ensure that in equilibrium a situation emerges,
where a mass producer sells the high quality to the rich and the low quality to the poor, we
make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 Inequality is su¢ ciently high such that the following three conditions are sat-
ised: (i) (qh   ql)R > (~ah   ~al)w, (ii) (1  ) (qhR   ~ahw)  (qhP   ~ahw), and (iii)
qlP   (1  ) qlR   ~alw  0.
Obviously the willingnesses to pay of rich and poor households, R and P , will be de-
termined endogenously in general equilibrium (see next section). Condition (i) says that the
willingness to pay of rich households for the quality gap qh   ql is su¢ ciently high relative to
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the cost gap (~ah   ~al)w so that a mass producer strictly prefers selling the high quality to the
rich and the low quality to the poor at prices qlP and qlP + (qh   ql)R, respectively, to
selling the low quality at price qlP to all consumers. Condition (ii) says that an exclusive rm
weakly prefers selling only to rich households at price qhR rather than selling to all households
at price qhP . Finally, condition (iii) says that a producer with access to the mass production
technology is weakly better o¤ separating the market (selling the low quality to the poor and
the high quality to the rich) rather than selling the high quality only to the rich at a higher
price qhR. Our assumption ql=~al > qh=~ah guarantees that (ii) and (iii) are compatible.
In the next section we study the balanced growth path where all exclusive producers sell
their high quality only to the rich, and all mass producers sell the low quality to the poor and the
high quality to the rich. Along this path all inequalities in Assumption 1 hold strictly. This does
not need to be the case during a transition towards the balanced growth path. The case where
condition (ii) holds with equality and condition (iii) holds with strict inequality corresponds
to a situation where the economy has few mass producers, so that the poor purchase all
mass consumption goods in low quality but also purchase some luxuries. The case where
condition (iii) holds with equality and condition (ii) holds with strict inequality corresponds to
a situation where there are so many mass producers that the poor cannot a¤ord to purchase
all mass consumption goods but only a subset of them.15
Proposition 1 a) Suppose conditions (ii) and (iii) in Assumption 1 hold with strict inequality.
Then every exclusive producer sells only to the rich, charges price pe = qhR and earns prot
e = (1  )L (pe   ~ahw). Every mass producer sells the low quality to the poor at price
pl = qlP and the high quality to the rich at price ph = qlP+(qh   ql)R and earns prot m =
(1  )L (ph   ~ahw)+L (pl   ~alw) : b) When condition (ii) holds with equality, exclusive rms
are indi¤erent between selling only to rich and to all households. c) When condition (iii) holds
with equality, mass rms are indi¤erent between selling the high quality only to the rich at
price qhR and separating the market. In that case we have e = m.
Proof. See Appendix A.
It is also instructive to see what happens if some of the conditions of Assumption 1 are
violated. In that case, mass producers supply only one quality. They may sell only the low
quality to the whole customer base. This case is similar to the one we will study below and
will emerge when inequality is not too large. Alternatively, mass producers may not have an
15The assumption ql=~al > qh=~ah precludes that both (ii) and (iii) hold with equality. Also notice that the
rich purchase all goods in every case. Both exclusive and mass producers which do not sell to the rich have
strictly lower prots and hence will undercut prices to get the rich as customers. Similarly, rms that sell to
some poor households sell to all poor households.
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incentive to supply the low quality. This case is obviously not interesting because there does
not exist an incentive to undertake a process innovation and the model essentially reduces to
one of expanding product varieties.16
3.5 R&D and resources
Inventing a new good and setting up a new exclusive rm is attractive as long as the value of this
product innovation (the present value of future cash ows) does not fall short of the initial R&D
cost. Initial R&D costs are w(t) ~F (t) and, taking labor as the numeraire so that w(t) = A(t),
we have w(t) ~F (t) = F . The present value of a new innovation depends on whether and, if
so, when the rm implements the mass production technology. The process innovation costs
are w(t) ~G(t) = G. Denote by  the duration between the product innovation and the process
innovation, i.e. the rm "age" at which to implement the mass production technology; and by
e(j; t) and m(j; t) the prots before and after implementing mass production, respectively.
Then the value of a rm that introduces a new product at date  is given by
V (j; ) = max

Z +

e(j; t)e
 R(t;)dt+
Z 1
+
m(j; t)e
 R(t;)dt Ge R(+;)

:
With free entry into the R&D sector, the general equilibrium leaves no prot opportunities
unexploited. Hence the value of a product innovation cannot exceed the initial R&D cost
V (j; t)  F .
Finally, the economy-wide resource constraint has to be satised at all times. Aggregate
labor supply is xed to L. Aggregate labor demand comes from the R&D sector and the
production sector which produces (high- and low-quality) output. In the R&D sector, _N(t) ~F (t)
units of labor are engaged in designing entirely new products, and _M(t) ~G(t) units of labor are
used to implement new mass production technologies. In the production sector Yh(t)ah(t) and
Yl(t)al(t) units of labor are employed to produce high-quality and low-quality output denoted
by Yh(t) and Yl(t), respectively. The resource constraint of the economy can be written as
Yh(t)~ah(t) + Yl(t)~al(t) + _N(t) ~F (t) + _M(t) ~G(t)  L:
4 General equilibrium and balanced growth
We are now ready to consider the dynamic general equilibrium of the economy described above.
In this and the next section we analyze the balanced growth path and leave the analysis of
16 In the dynamic context this means there is no incentive to undertake a process innovation because the
return to this investment is too low. An alternative polar case would be one where rms have an extremely high
incentive to undertake the process innovation because process innovations are very cheap. In that case all rms
would invest in both product and process innovation right from the beginning, again reducing the framework
to a situation of expanding product varieties in which the high quality is never produced.
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transitional dynamics to section 6 below. In the balanced growth equilibrium, there is both
continuous introduction of entirely new products and continuous adoption of new processes
that allow mass production of former exclusive goods. In the main text we focus on the most
interesting equilibrium situation where mass producers sell the high quality to the rich and the
low quality to the poor, i.e. where Assumption 1 holds. Situations where Assumption 1 does
not hold are analyzed in Appendix B.
Denition 1 A balanced growth equilibrium in our economy consists of a path where the
interest rate r(t) is constant; the stock of knowledge A(t), the wage rate w(t), the total number
of rms N(t), and the number of mass producers M(t) grow at the constant rate g. Hence
the fraction of mass producers m =M(t)=N(t) is constant and labor requirements ~ah(t), ~al(t),
~F (t), and ~G(t) shrink at rate g. Prot maximizing prices pe(j; t), ph(j; t) and pl(j; t), and
instantaneous prots e(j; t) and m(j; t) are the same for all rms and constant over time.
Given Assumption 1, rich households consume all N(t) goods in high quality and poor house-
holds consume all M(t) mass consumption goods in low quality. Hence the level of consumption
of rich cR(t) = qhN(t) and poor cP (t) = qlM(t) also grows at rate g. Both types of households
have the same savings rate, so the distribution of wealth is stationary.
4.1 Product and process innovations
In a balanced growth equilibrium, the prots of exclusive and mass producers are constant
over time and given by e and m dened in Proposition 1 and the interest rate r is constant.
The optimal timing of the process innovation simplies to
max

Z +

ee
 r(t )dt+
Z 1
+
me
 r(t )dt Ge r:
Using the Leibniz rule we obtain
 =
8>>><>>>:
0
[0;1)
1
if (m   e)=r > G;
if (m   e)=r = G;
if (m   e)=r < G:
The above condition says that the present value of the increased prot ow is compared to
innovation costs. We are interested in an equilibrium outcome where exclusive producers and
mass producers co-exist so the rst and third case of the above condition can be ruled out.
This means the optimal timing of a process innovation  is undetermined. In other words
rms are indi¤erent whether and when to invest in process innovation. However, the aggregate
fraction of rms which have invested in process innovation, i.e. the fraction of mass producers,
is determined in equilibrium.
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The indeterminacy of the individual product cycle is due to the symmetry in preferences
and technology. The symmetry assumption is not critical for our results. In fact, introduc-
ing asymmetries in our basic framework generates deterministic product cycles (featuring the
empirically observed mentioned in Section 2). However, asymmetries complicate the analysis
without leading to any substantial changes in our results. In Appendix C we sketch two such
extensions. In the rst extension we relax the symmetry in preferences by introducing hier-
archic preferences, a xed ranking of all varieties in the product space (by attaching unequal
utility weights to the various goods). It is straightforward to see that innovations follow the
consumption hierarchy (i.e. high priority goods are invented rst) and that new products are
initially o¤ered only to rich households. The optimal date for process innovation is when the
poor have become richer and are willing to pay a su¢ ciently high price so that the mass pro-
duction technology breaks even. A second extension models asymmetry into the technology
of rms by introducing learning-by-doing at the level of the individual rm. When individ-
ual manufacturing experiences facilitate production, rms initially serve the smaller, exclusive
market since manufacturing costs are still relatively high. As soon as su¢ cient production
experience has been gained, it becomes optimal for the rm to invest in the mass production
technology serving the entire market.
Returning to the basic model, the following no-arbitrage conditions must hold:
VN =
e
r =
(1 )L(qhR ah)
r = F;
VM =
(m e)
r =
L[qlP (1 )qlR al]
r = G:
(3)
Note that, along the balanced growth path, all involved variables are constant over time.
The present value of the prot ow enabled by product innovation VN must be equal to initial
product R&D costs. And the present value of the incremental prot ow enabled by subsequent
process innovation VM must be equal to process innovation costs. Note that VN increases in
the purchasing power of the rich, while VM increases in the purchasing power of the poor.
Higher inequality raises incentives for product innovation relative to process innovation, while
a more egalitarian society increases incentives for process innovation.
4.2 Growth and mass production
In a balanced growth equilibrium, expenditures grow at rate g and prices are constant. Hence,
consumption growth of poor and rich households follows the standard Euler equation:
r = g + ; (4)
With a constant interest rate r and a constant growth rate g, the present value of household is
lifetime income is equal to w(t)`i=+vi(t). Because poor households are endowed with  units
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of labor and v(t) units of rm shares and rich households are endowed with (1  )=(1  )
units of labor and [(1  )=(1  )] v(t) units of rm shares, a rich household receives an
income stream that is [(1  )=(1  )] = times as large as the one of a poor household.17
The log-specication of intertemporal preferences implies that the ow of expenditures of a rich
household compared to a poor on the balanced growth path needs to be [(1  )=(1  )] =
times as large, too. Recalling that the mN(t) mass producers charge price ph for the high
quality and pl for the low quality and the (1 m)N(t) exclusive producers charge price pe, the
expenditure ow of a poor household is plmN(t) and the expenditure ow of a rich household
is [phm+ pe(1 m)]N(t). Hence the ratio of the expenditure ow of a rich relative to a poor
household is
mph + (1 m)pe
mpl
=
1  
(1  ) ; (5)
where pe = qhR, pl = qlP , and ph = qlP + (qh   ql)R (see Proposition 1).
We can now characterize and analyze the balanced growth equilibrium using two equations,
a no-arbitrage curve and a resource curve. Using the no-arbitrage conditions (3), we can
express the price of the lower quality as pl = qlP = (1   ) [qlR + (qhR   ah)G=F ] + al.
Combining this with the above expression for relative expenditures (5) lets us write the price
of the exclusive good as
pe = qhR = qh
al=(1  )  ahG=F
 (qh=m  ql) = (1  )  ql   qhG=F ; (6)
from which we can infer ph = pl + (qh   ql)pe=qh. Plugging (6) into the no-arbitrage condition
of the exclusive producer and using the Euler equation (4) yields the no-arbitrage curve (NA)
g =
L
F

qh
al   (1  )ahG=F
 (qh=m  ql) = (1  )  ql   qhG=F   (1  )ah

  ; (7)
which expresses the growth rate g in terms of the fraction of mass goods m. The NA-curve
is upward sloping in m if Fal > G(1   )ah and downward sloping otherwise. Keeping g
constant, the fraction of mass producers m rises in , and falls in  to keep (7) in equilibrium.18
This is because lower inequality raises the purchasing power of the poor. Hence there will be
more mass production m and less exclusion 1 m.
A second equation in m and g is derived from the aggregate resource constraint in the
economy. Recall that along the balanced growth path the rich consume all N(t) goods in high
17Here we stick to the simplifying assumption that the income composition of rich and poor households is
identical. As mentioned above, this is a special case that makes the analysis simple and transparent. The more
general (and more realistic) case when income composition di¤ers between rich and poor housholds does not
add economic substance to the analysis. However, in the next section, when we study transitional dynamics we
need to give up this assumption since the wealth distribution is no longer stationary.
18An increase in  is o¤setting an increase in m as the denominator in the NA-curve is strictly increasing in 
given its derivative with respect to  of (qh=m  ql)=(1  )2 > 0. Similar computations reveal that a decrease
in  is o¤setting an increase in m.
18
quality and the poor consume all M(t) mass consumption goods in low quality. Hence we
can write L = (1  )LN(t)ah=A(t) + LM(t)al=A(t) + _N(t)F=A(t) + _M(t)G=A(t): Using the
equation of motion for the aggregate stock of knowledge (1) and the denitionsm =M(t)=N(t)
and g = _N(t)=N(t) = _M(t)=M(t) we can express the resource curve (RC) as
g =
L
h
( + (1   )m)1=   (1  )ah   alm
i
F +Gm
: (8)
Notice that the RC-curve may be upward or downward sloping. On the one hand, there
is a demand e¤ect. An increase in m is associated with higher consumption of the poor.
Hence more employment is needed to satisfy this additional demand leaving fewer resources
for research. On the other hand, there is a productivity e¤ect. An increase in m means that
nal output is produced in a more e¢ cient way which saves resources that become available for
innovation and growth. Under our specication for the evolution of the knowledge stock (1),
the productivity e¤ect depends on the importance of process innovation in pushing ahead the
knowledge frontier. This is captured by the parameter  . The lower is  , the more important
are process innovations as drivers of technical knowledge and the stronger is the productivity
e¤ect. Note also that the distribution parameter  does not enter the resource curve. The
resource curve shifts up when the population share of the poor  rises.
Proposition 2 A balanced growth equilibrium determined by the intersection of the two curves
(7) and (8) exists if Assumption 1 holds with strict inequalities.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The idea of the proof is the following: to determine whether the outcome where mass
producers separate households and exclusive producers sell only to rich households is indeed
an equilibrium, one needs to compute R and P using the above equations for a given set of
parameters, and test whether Assumption 1 holds with strict inequalities. If this is the case, no
rm has an incentive to deviate (see Proposition 1). Assumption 1 holds if the quality gap qh ql
is su¢ ciently high (but not too high) relative to the cost gap ah   al and process innovation
costs G; and if inequality is su¢ ciently high, i.e. the group of poor  is su¢ ciently large as well
as the distribution parameter  is not too high. Conversely, a low quality gap would induce all
rms to become mass producers and supply only the low quality. Similarly, if the quality gap
were too high, there would be no incentive to invest in process innovations. These outcomes are
less interesting as the model essentially reduces to one of expanding product varieties. When
inequality is too low, a further outcome arises in which mass producers sell the low quality to
all households. We will characterize these other outcomes in Appendix B in more detail. The
existence of a positive growth equilibrium is determined by comparing the horizontal m-axis
intercepts of the NA- and RC-curve (denoted by mNA and mRC). Assumption 1 guarantees
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that the RC-curve (8) holds for g > 0 if m = 1: The equilibrium is unique if mRC < mNA
and the NA-curve is upward sloping since the NA-curve is convex and the RC-curve is concave
when upward sloping, consider Figure 4.19
FIGURE 4
5 Income inequality and technical change
We will rst analyze the equilibrium for the two polar cases of  = 1 when technological
spillovers are generated only by product innovations, and  = 0 so that technical progress is
driven only by process innovations.
5.1 Product innovation as driver of productivity growth
When product innovation is the only driver of productivity growth, we have  = 1 and equation
(1) becomes A(t) = N(t). While the no-arbitrage curve (7) remains unchanged, the resource
constraint simplies to
g =
L [1  (1  )ah   alm]
F +Gm
: (9)
The resource curve is downward sloping in m, since a larger share of mass producers requires
more labor for manufacturing and process innovation, leaving less labor for product R&D, the
driver of growth. Panel a) of Figure 4 displays the two curves and the equilibrium in this case.
In the case of A(t) = N(t), inequality is benecial for growth. A redistribution of income
from the poor to the rich (reducing ) leaves the resource curve unchanged, but shifts the no-
arbitrage curve to the left, as depicted in the left-hand panel of Figure 5. A richer upper class
has a higher willingness to pay for products, and this price e¤ect increases prots. Product
inventions become more attractive, spurring technical progress and growth. From a resource
point of view, redistributing wealth from the poor to the rich raises exclusion in the economy,
setting free resources from the manufacturing and the process R&D sectors, which become
available for product R&D, the driver of growth.
FIGURE 5
Increasing the size of the group of poor households , while holding  constant, raises
inequality (see section 3.1. above). As can be seen from the right-hand panel of Figure 5,
the resource curve shifts up and the no-arbitrage curve shifts to the left. The reason is that a
19The condition mRC < mNA trivially holds if the RC-curve has a vertical axis intercept in the positive (m; g)-
quadrant, which is true whenever  1= > (1  )ah. When mRC  mNA or the NA-curve is downward sloping,
there may (but need not) be multiple balanced growth equilibria. Apart from the locally stable steady state,
there exists an intermediate unstable steady state (and a stagnation equilibrium) in that case. See Appendix B.
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higher  is associated with higher inequality. (With  given, relative incomes of rich households,
(1  ) = [(1  )], increase). While there are less rich households reducing the market for
the exclusive goods, the (remaining) rich have a higher willingness to pay. It turns out that the
latter (price) e¤ect dominates the former (market size) e¤ect so prots for exclusive producers
increase for a given m and g. In the new equilibrium we have fewer mass producers m which
releases (manufacturing and process R&D) resources which are channeled into product R&D,
and hence growth g is higher.
In sum, higher inequality (either due to a lower  or due to a higher , or both) is benecial
for growth, provided that growth is driven purely by product innovations.
5.2 Process innovations as productivity drivers
The result that inequality is benecial for growth hinges upon the assumption that only prod-
uct innovations a¤ect productivity growth whereas process innovation activities do not at all
impact technical progress. We now consider the other extreme, when  = 0, so that technical
knowledge is entirely determined by past process R&D activities, A(t) = M(t). The resource
curve becomes
g =
L [1  (1  )ah=m  al]
F=m+G
; (10)
and is now upward sloping. As process innovation is the key to become a mass producer,
a higher share of mass production m is benecial for growth. A higher prevalence of mass
production raises aggregate productivity. In contast to before a higher m implies less (low-
productive) exclusive sectors which saves resources for process R&D. Panel b) of Figure 4
illustrates the two curves and the equilibrium graphically.
A higher extent of inequality due to lower incomes of poor households  shifts the no-
arbitrage curve to the left, as depicted graphically in the left-hand panel of Figure 6. The
result is less mass production m and also a lower incentive to undertake process innovations.
Hence the growth rate g falls.
FIGURE 6
Increasing the group size of poor households  shifts the no-arbitrage curve to the left
and shifts the resource curve up, as shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 6. The e¤ect on
growth is now ambiguous. When more income is concentrated in the hands of fewer rich, there
will be less mass consumption m. This has two e¤ects. On the one hand, the shift from mass
consumption to exclusive markets decreases average productivity in manufacturing. On the
other hand, less mass production also implies that fewer resources are needed for production
which can be used for R&D and growth. Computations show that either e¤ect may dominate.
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5.3 The general case
Having analyzed the two polar cases, we have demonstrated that inequality may be either
benecial or harmful for growth, depending on the source of technical progress and productivity
growth in the economy. Inequality has an e¤ect on prices and on the size of markets. On the
one hand, a higher willingness to pay of the rich households raises prices and prot margins,
spurring entry and thus product innovation. On the other hand, a high level of exclusion
reduces mass consumption markets, and thus incentives for process innovation.
The general case lies in between the two polar cases. Let us write down the resource curve
here as a function of m,
g(m) =
L
h
( + (1   )m)1=   (1  )ah   alm
i
F +Gm
;
The inequality-growth relationship depends on the slope of this function:
Proposition 3 Given Assumption 1, an increase in inequality due to a lower relative income
of poor consumers (lower ) leads to a higher prevalence of mass producers m: If the resource
curve is (locally) decreasing in m, g0(m) < 0, inequality raises growth. If it is increasing,
inequality hurts growth.
We have shown above that for a given g, the fraction of mass producers increases in . Hence
m declines in inequality (given that  does not enter the resource curve directly), and the impact
on growth depends on the slope of the resource curve. In the cases of  = 1 and  = 0, we
have shown that the resource curve is (globally) downward and upward sloping, respectively.
For intermediate cases of  , where productivity growth is driven by both product and process
innovation, the sign of the inequality-growth relationship depends on the dominating source
of technical change and on the extent of inequality. Under the assumption that the aggregate
stock of knowledge evolves according to (1), the marginal contribution of process innovations,
@A(t)=@M(t) is innite at m = 0; limm >0 g0(m) = +1: Hence, as long as  < 1, the
RC curve slopes upwards for low m: For larger values of m the resource curve eventually
becomes downward sloping. Intuitively, there are complementarities between product and
process innovation. When an economy has invested relatively little in process innovation, it is
likely to benet more from process innovations and vice versa.
Taken together, for 0 <  < 1, the resource curve becomes hump-shaped as depicted in
Figure 7. Higher inequality fosters growth if inequality is initially low (and the fraction of mass
producers is high), whereas higher inequality slows down growth if the extent of inequality is
already high initially. Therefore, in a very unequal society that is dominated by exclusive
markets lowering inequality is likely to increase growth. The expansion of mass consumption
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markets spurs process innovation and increases growth. However, in a very egalitarian society,
the relationship may be reversed, when innovation incentives are based on a better funded
upper class, so that the introduction of new goods becomes more attractive. As a result, both
very high levels and very low levels of inequality are harmful for growth. High long-run growth
rates are reached by intermediate degrees of inequality.
FIGURE 7
6 Transitional dynamics
In our framework, both demand and supply shocks may trigger periods of industrial change in
which a series of process innovations increases production and access to consumption markets,
causing as Perkin (1969) put it "a revolution in mens access to means of life" (cited by Mokyr,
1999). In this section, we undertake two thought experiments. In both cases we assume that
the economy is initially in an equilibrium that is characterized by low growth and low (or
complete absence of) mass production, and analyze exogenous shocks triggering a process of
transition toward a new steady state. In doing so, our analysis sheds light on the process by
which demand and/or supply shocks generate a take-up of productivity growth and a transition
of a society with high exclusion and low consumer-participation of the lower classes to a mass
consumption society.
The rst thought experiment is a demand shock generated by a major drop in inequality
through an increase in . Assume that the economy is initially in a steady state characterized
by high inequality and low mass production so that the initial balanced growth equilibrium is
located on the upward sloping branch of the resource curve (see Figure 7). As we have seen
in the last section, starting from such an equilibrium, a major drop in inequality leads to a
new balanced growth path with higher growth and a higher extent of mass production. One
potentially relevant situation from recent economic history is the substantial drop in inequal-
ity during the Great Depression and WWII that might help explain the boom in consumer
durables in the U.S. of the post-war era. The second thought experiment relates to a positive
productivity shock lowering the costs of process innovation, G. Such a shock may trigger an
industrial revolution through which an initially stagnant economy of craftsmanship and high
exclusion is transformed into an industrialized society with high consumer-participation and
growth.
Notice that the two state variables that characterize the transition process are the total
number of rms N(t) and the number of mass producers M(t). It turns out that, when the
economy operates along the balanced growth path both variables grow pari passu. When
the economy operates o¤ this path, there are either only product innovations or only process
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innovations but not both. We summarize this result in
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumption 1 holds and the economy features both product and process
innovations. Then the economy is on the balanced growth path.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The proposition has an important implication. We will see that, when the economy has too
few mass producers M(t), the transition process will be characterized by process innovations
only. Similarly, if there are too few exclusive producers N(t)  M(t), the transition process
will be characterized only by product innovations. Hence all adjustments in the state variable
m(t) = M(t)=N(t) occur by a "bang-bang" rule. We will also see that this implies that the
transition from an old to a new steady state will occur in nite time.
6.1 A major drop in inequality
An exogenous (and instantaneous) drop in inequality leads to transitional dynamics in our
framework during which the fraction of rms that have invested in process innovation increases.
One can think of the introduction of compulsory schooling, increasing relative productivity of
the poor, or an extreme event such as a war lowering nancial wealth inequality (such as during
WWII), leading to such an adjustment.
Initial and nal balanced growth equilibrium We assume that both in the initial and
nal balanced growth equilibrium conditions are such that exclusive producers sell (their high
quality) only to the rich; and mass producers sell the high quality to rich and the low quality
to poor households. In contrast to the analysis of the last section, we need to relax the
assumption of identical endowment distributions. This is because the transition process will
be characterized by a situation where the two types of households face di¤erent incentives
to save and hence will accumulate wealth at unequal speed. In other words, in the transition
process, the wealth distribution is no longer stationary invalidating the assumption ` = v = .
Instead we need to account for the fact that v(t) changes over time.
The initial and nal balanced growth paths are still characterized by the equations from
above, (3), (4), and (8). However, since ` may not be equal to v, equation (5) needs to be
adjusted, as relative lifetime incomes of rich households now depend on the factor income distri-
bution, i.e. on wages w(t) and rm values v(t). With a constant interest rate r and a constant
growth rate g, the present value of household is lifetime income (the right-hand-side of the
household is intertemporal budget constraint) equals w(t)`i=+ vi(t). By normalization, the
wage is equal to w(t) = A(t) = N(t) ( + (1   )m)1= and, from the zero-prot conditions
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(3), we have v(t)L = N(t) (F +mG). As the left-hand-side of a households intertemporal bud-
get constraint is una¤ected by the more general specication of the endowment distributions,
we can rewrite equation (5) as
mph + (1 m)pe
mpl
= (m); (11)
where relative lifetime incomes (m) are now given by
(m)  (1  v)(F +mG) + (1  `)L ( + (1   )m
)1=
(1  )v(F +mG) + (1  )`L ( + (1   )m)1=
;
with m(m) > 0 since (v; `) < (1; 1). Note also that (m) decreases in both v and `.
We can solve this more general case in a similar way as above. First calculate pe = qhR
using equation (11) and no-arbitrage conditions (3). Then plug the resulting expression into
the no-arbitrage condition for the exclusive producer to get a new no-arbitrage curve (7)
g =
L(1  )
F

qh
al   (1  )ahG=F
(qh=m  ql) = ((m)  1)  (1  ) (ql + qhG=F )   ah

  ; (12)
For a given growth rate g, raising v or ` increases m, since (m) is increasing in m as well as
decreasing in v and `. Lowering nancial wealth or labor income inequality reduces exclusion.
Hence, in much the same way as above, the inequality-growth relationship depends on the slope
of the resource curve.
Transition Now consider a mean-preserving spread in the endowment distributions raising
incomes of poor households at the expense of the rich, so that (0v(t0); 
0
`) > (v; `), in a bal-
anced growth equilibrium at time t = t0. Imagine that the introduction of compulsory schooling
increases relative productivity of the poor,20 0` > `, or shares in rms are redistributed (e.g.
during a war) from rich to poor, 0v(t0) > v.
FIGURE 8
Figure 8 illustrates the transitional dynamics triggered by a drop in inequality. As a result of
the shift in purchasing power, poor households increase consumption whereas the consumption
of rich households initially stagnates. Since the economy has too few mass producers M(t),
demand for the mass production technology is high, and all R&D resources are temporarily
directed towards process innovation. The economy reaches the new steady state in nite time
at t = t2 when product innovations become attractive again. The gure is drawn in such a
20Strictly speaking, introducing/increasing compulsory schooling leads to a more equal endowment distribu-
tion by changing not only the spread but also the mean of the labor endowment distribution. It is straightfor-
ward to see that an increase in L increases growth because the model exhibits a scale e¤ect. Here our focus are
distributional consequences, hence we consider mean-preserving spreads.
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way that growth is higher in the nal state, which is the case if inequality is su¢ ciently high
in the initial state such that the resource curve is upward sloping (g0(m) < 0 see Proposition
3). The following proposition characterizes the transition process in detail:
Proposition 5 Suppose Assumption 1 holds at all times. a) A fall in inequality at date t0,
from (v; `) to (0v(t0); 
0
`), triggers a transition period of nite duration (t0; t2) where _N(t) = 0
and _M(t) > 0. A new balanced growth equilibrium with m0 > m is reached at date t2. b)
During the entire transition period consumption of the rich stagnates at cR(t) = qhN(t0). c)
When the initial reduction in inequality is substantial, cP (t) jumps to a higher level at date t0.
During a rst transition period, t 2 [t0; t1), cP (t) > qlM(t); during a second transition period,
t 2 [t1; t2), cP (t) = qlM(t). When the initial reduction in inequality is minor, cP (t) does not
change discontinuously at date t0, the rst transition period does not exist and cP (t) = qlM(t)
for all t > t0.
See Appendix D for the technical details including a description of the procedure of nu-
merical simulations. The discussion here is conned to the key dynamics to understand the
main results and the intuition behind these results. If Assumption 1 holds for both (v; `)
and (0v; 
0
`), the balanced growth equilibrium before and after the transition corresponds to
a situation where exclusive producers sell (their high quality) only to the rich and the mass
producers sell the high quality to the rich and the low quality to the poor. A redistribution
from top to bottom has two key e¤ects. First, there is an e¤ect on the direction of technical
change as only process but no product innovations occur during transition. Redistributing
income towards the poor raises their purchasing power and their willingness to pay relative
to the one of the rich. Consequently, process innovations become temporarily strictly more
attractive than product invention and all R&D activities are concentrated on the implementa-
tion of mass production technologies. During this period interest rates are constant and given
by
r1G =

ql
qh
  al
ah

Lah: (13)
The right-hand side is the incremental prot ow from a mass separating strategy, which must
be equal to the current interest rate times the investment for process innovation.21
The second e¤ect concerns the price setting behavior of exclusive producers. If the drop
in inequality is substantial, it becomes attractive for exclusive producers to exploit the higher
willingness to pay of the poor. An (endogenous) fraction of exclusive producers will set a price
that equals the willingness to pay of the poor and sell temporarily to all households; and the
remaining fraction of exclusive producers will still sell only to the rich at a price equal to their
21We have used condition (14) to eliminate the willingness-to-pay of rich and poor in the incremental prot
ow, L (qlP (t)  (1  )qlR(t)  al). The ow must be equal to r1G since VP (t) = G and thus _VP (t) = 0:
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(high) willingness to pay.22 During the rst transition period t 2 (t0; t1) exclusive producers
are indi¤erent between setting a low price and selling to all households and setting a high price
and selling only to the rich, i.e. we must have
L (qhP (t)  ah) = L(1  ) (qhR(t)  ah) : (14)
It is also interesting to look at optimal consumption choices during transition. We need to
adjust the Euler equation for the rich. Recall that consumption expenditures are qhR(t)N(t)
and, since in transition _N(t)=N(t) = 0, consumption expenditures grow at rate _R(t)=R(t).
The Euler equation therefore determines the growth rate of the willingness to pay of the rich
_R(t)
R(t)
= r1   : (15)
When the drop in inequality is substantial, poor householdsconsumption expenditures in the
rst transition period are P (t)cP (t) where cP (t) is the consumption aggregator for the poor
households (see section 3.3). The Euler equation of a poor household therefore is
_P (t)
P (t)
+
_cP (t)
cP (t)
= r1   : (16)
Because (14) must hold during the rst transition phase, it must be that P (t) increases at a
smaller rate than r1   .23 Consequently, _cP (t)=cP (t) > 0. Denote by NP (t) the number of
goods that the poor can a¤ord. During the rst period of transition we have NP (t) > M(t)
and cP (t) = qlM(t) + qh(NP (t) M(t)). Since M(t) grows faster than NP (t), there is a date
t = t1 where we have reached M(t1) = NP (t1). From date t1 onwards we have cP (t) = qlM(t).
The equal-prot condition (14) does not hold anymore and exclusive producers are strictly
better o¤ selling only to the rich. R(t) continues to grow at rate r(t)   ; but P (t) grows
more slowly. Interest rates are no longer constant, but still determined by incremental prot
ows and investment costs for process innovation.
The nal law of motion comes from the resource constraint. Recalling that in the entire
transition period we have _N(t) = 0 and N(t) = N(t0) we can write
_M(t)G=L = A(N(t0);M(t))   [M(t)al + (NP (t) M(t))ah]  (1  )N(t0)ah: (17)
Moreover, we have initial conditionsM(t0) = mN(t0) and N(t0), and transversality conditions
for rich and poor households. At date t2, the economy reaches the new balanced growth
22The fraction of exclusive producers that sell to all households depends on the extent to which the consumer
budget of the poor exceeds the spending on mass consumption goods. In the transition, as the fraction of mass
producers increases the share of exclusive producers that sell to all households decreases. By date t1 the number
of rms that have adopted mass production has increased su¢ ciently so that the optimal spending of the poor
exactly coincides with spending on mass consumption goods only.
23From (14) it is straighforward to calculate _P (t)=P (t) = [(1  ) _R(t) + ah] = [(1  )R(t) + ah] <
_R(t)=R(t) = r1   
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equilibrium with m(t) = m0 in nite time as soon as product innovation becomes attractive
again, r(t)F = L(1  )(qhR(t)  ah).
Note that in the opposite case of a decrease in (v; `), raising inequality, one can show
that innovation is purely directed to product innovation during the transition. A phase in
which one engine of growth stops temporarily is not specic to our set-up. See Matsuyama
(1999) for another example where in one phase product variety expansion stops, while the
economy accumulates physical capital. In our framework, expansion of variety stops while the
economy accumulates process innovation. In fact, this transition closely resembles the related
work of directed technical change (see Proposition 1 of Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001), where
only one type of innovation takes place outside the balanced growth equilibrium. Alternatively,
Galor and Moav (2004, 2006) have developed models where in the early stages physical capital
accumulation was the prime source of growth, while in latter stages human capital emerged as
growth engine.
To sum up, a substantial drop in inequality may trigger a period of industrial change where
innovation activity is purely directed towards process innovation. Such a transition could have
been triggered by the substantial drop in inequality during the Great Depression and WWII,
helping to explain the boom in consumer durables in the U.S. in the post-war era.
6.2 Positive productivity shock
Process innovations, such as the introduction of assembly lines, play an important role in the
emergence of modern mass consumption markets. In this subsection we study an economy in a
stagnant/low-growth state where process innovation initially is too expensive or not available
at all (G prohibitively high). If a positive productivity shock lowers G su¢ ciently, the economy
experiences a takeo¤, transforming a stagnant (or low-growth) highly exclusive economy into
an economy with high consumer-participation and growth.
Initial exlusive stage Suppose that, initially, the economy is characterized by a balanced
growth equilibrium where process innovations are absent altogether. More precisely, assume
initially G is too high to make process innovations su¢ ciently attractive. In such a steady state
the economy invests only in product innovations. Active rms do not have access to the mass
production technology. (Think of the high quality as goods produced by craftsmen. The poor
households can only a¤ord a very limited subset of these expensive, hand-crafted goods, e.g.
one set of furniture which holds for a lifetime or one tailored suit.) Hence the initial equilibrium
is characterized by a situation where a fraction nP = NP (t)=N(t) of producers serve the entire
customer base at price qhP and a fraction 1 nP = (N(t) NP (t))=N(t) sells their product only
to the rich at price qhR. Lifetime income of houshold i still is w(t)`i=+vi(t). However, since
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the (initial) balanced growth equilibrium features m = 0, we have w(t) = A(t) = N(t) 1= and
v(t)L = N(t)F . The relative budget constraint of a rich to a poor household (5) now becomes
(1  nP )R + nPP
nPP
= (0)  (1  v)F + (1  `)L 
1=
(1  )vF + (1  )`L 1=
;
and the no-arbitrage and resource curves read
g =
L(1  )
F

ah
(1=nP   1) = ((0)  1)  (1  )   ah

  ; and
g =
L[ 1=   (1   + nP)ah]
F
:
In this initial stage, the long-run growth performance of the economy is weak because
technical progress is only fueled by product R&D whereas process R&D projects are not
undertaken at all. As a result manufacturing acitivities and product invention is relatively
unproductive (high ~F (t) and ~ah(t)). In this initial stage, raising inequality clearly is benecial
for growth as higher exclusion frees up resources for product R&D.
Transition Consider an exogenous positive productivity shock, G0 < G, lowering investment
costs of process innovations su¢ ciently such that
rG0 <

ql
qh
  al
ah

Lah < rG: (18)
The incremental prot ow of having implemented process innovation must be greater than
prevailing interest rates times the investment amount, G0.24 Process innovations become at-
tractive once productivity gains, al=ah, su¢ ciently outweigh quality discounts, ql=qh. Such a
positive supply shock triggers an industrial revolution in which a series of process innovation
transforms the initial exclusive society into a modern mass consumption society.
FIGURE 9
Figure 9 displays the evolution of the economy around the transition from an exclusive
to a mass consumption society. After the economy experiences a positive productivity shock
lowering G at time t0, product innovation temporarily halts as rms focus on innovating
their manufacturing processes. In this phase, consumption of the rich stagnates, whereas
the product range of the poor grows as they shift their consumption towards goods at lower
prices and quality once available. After all mass producers have innovated their manufacturing
process, product invention activities resume once the economy reaches the new balanced growth
equilibrium with higher growth and lower exclusion in nite time. The transition process
resembles the one following a shift in inequality from above (see Appendix E):
24Similarly to the rst example of a transition, we have used condition (4) to eliminate the willingness-to-pay
of rich and poor in the additional prot ow, L (qlP (t)  (1  )qlR(t)  al), which initially must hold.
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Proposition 6 Suppose Assumption 1 holds after the shock: a) A substantial drop in process
innovation costs, G0 < G, at t = t0 such that condition (18) holds, triggers a transition of nite
duration t 2 (t0; t2) with _N(t) = 0 and _M(t) > 0. From t2 onwards, the economy is in a new
steady state with m > 0. b) Consumption of the rich stagnates at cR(t) = qhN(t0) during the
entire transition. c) Consumption of the poor jumps to cP (t0) = qhNP (t0) at date t0: During
a rst phase of the transition, t 2 (t0; t1), cP (t) = qlM(t) + qh(NP (t) M(t)) grows at a rate
lower than _M(t)=M(t). During a second phase of transition t 2 (t1; t2), cP (t) and M(t) grow
pari passu.
If poor households immediately stopped consuming higher quality goods, consumption of
the poor would need to drop to zero, since immediately after the shock no rm is able to o¤er
the low quality yet. This cannot be the case due to innite marginal utility at zero consumption.
Hence, there is an initial phase withM(t) < NP (t) corresponding to the initial phase following
a drop in inequality, characterized by the dynamic system (14)-(17) with initial conditions
M(t0) = 0 and N(t0) > 0, and transversality conditions. During the rst phase t 2 (t0; t1)
poor households purchase both high-quality goods produced with the ine¢ cient technology and
low-quality goods produced with the new mass production technology. From date t1 onwards,
only rms that have made the process innovation sell to the poor. In this second transition
phase all R&D activity still consists of process innovation and only when the new balanced
growth level of m =M(t)=N(t) has been reached, rms start developing new products. Given
the stagnant consumption of rich households, _N(t) = 0, prices for exclusive goods increase
relative to mass goods until product innovation becomes attractive again, and the economy
reaches the new balanced growth equilibrium, corresponding to the one of Proposition 2 with
Assumption 1 holding. Growth is higher in the new balanced growth equilibrium if process
innovation is su¢ ciently important for technical progress and productivity growth (if  and 
are not too high).
Process innovations are able to transform the initial stagnant/low-growth economy bur-
dened by high exclusion into a modern mass consumption society characterized by signicantly
higher growth and lower exclusion. Notice that our results are quite di¤erent from those in
Matsuyama (2002) who also studies the transition to a mass consumption society. In contrast
to the learning-by-doing formulation of Matsuyama, where competitive rms experience tech-
nical progress due to past production experience, in our case intentional innovation activities
drive the adoption of mass production technologies and the introduction of mass consumption
goods. Hence, under certain parameter values, our analysis may feature a situation where,
in the initial exclusive society, inequality is unambiguously benecial for growth, while after
the transition to a new steady state, the inequality-growth relationship may be turned upside
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down. Once mass production technologies break even, a more egalitarian society increases
mass consumption markets fostering process innovation and brings the economy on a steeper
long-run growth path.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we presented an endogenous growth model where rms invest both in product
and process innovations. Product innovations (that open up completely new product lines)
satisfy the luxurious wants of the rich. Subsequent process innovations (that decrease costs per
unit of quality) transform the luxurious products of the rich into conveniences of the poor. A
prototypical example for such a product cycle is the automobile. Initially an exclusive product
for the very rich, the automobile became a¤ordable to the middle class after the introduction
of Fords Model T, the car that "put America on wheels". We argue that recent economic
history is full of examples where consumer durables followed a similar product cycle.
Our analysis shows that the extent of economic inequality in a society generates substan-
tially di¤erent incentives for product and process innovation. An egalitarian society creates
strong incentives to adopt mass production technologies that allow the production of low-
quality low-cost versions of existing luxuries (such as Model T). In contrast, an unequal society
creates strong incentives for product innovations (new luxuries). Depending on which type of
innovative activity drives technical progress, economic inequality is harmful or benecial for
long-run growth. This distinct role of product and process innovations goes in an important
way beyond standard R&D based growth models, in which process innovations and product in-
ventions are often mathematically similar (Acemoglu, 2009). To investigate the role of income
inequality, one must deviate from the standard homothetic preferences. If the wealthy upper
class consumes both more and better goods than the large majority of poorer households, in
line with both casual observation and empirical evidence, inequality shapes product markets
and thus relative incentives for product versus process innovation.
Our framework is su¢ ciently simple and tractable so that we can characterize not only
balanced growth paths but also transition processes. Studying transitional dynamics is not only
interesting from a methodological point of view but is relevant to better understand episodes
in recent economic history. For instance, our analysis has shown that a major redistribution of
economic resources such as the fall in U.S. income inequality between the Great Depression and
WWII may help to explain the post-war boom in consumer durables. Our analysis shows that
a demand shock arising from a major income redistribution temporarily generates very strong
incentives for process innovations and the introduction of mass consumption goods. Similarly,
major technological inventions, such as the assembly line, also give temporary strong incentives
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to implement mass production technologies so that existing sectors one after the other adopt
mass production technologies, leading to a trickle-down process from which the poor benet
disproportionately.
For the sake of simplicity and tractability, our model reduced the income distribution to
two groups of households. A more general income distribution would smooth the product
cycle with penetration levels following logistic Engel curves in the aggregate (rather than a
jump as in the stylized case of two groups of consumers). A new producer would start out
serving only the richest households and then, by setting lower prices, expand the market step-
by-step (in the case of a discrete number of distinct groups) or continuously (in the case of
a continuous endowment distribution). Once a certain "cut-o¤" date has been reached, the
producer would invest in process innovation. However, apart from generating more realistic
dynamics of product penetration, such a generalization while substantially complicating the
formal analysis would add little additional economic insight to the model.
Our model has abstracted from continuous quality improvements of existing goods. It
was assumed that quality adjustments occur only once when the process innovation is made
and the mass production technology together with a low-quality version of an existing luxury
good is implemented. However, continuous quality improvements both of luxuries and mass
consumption goods are important features of reality. Our model could be easily adapted to
account for exogenous quality increases. If qh and ql increased at an exogenous rate, all features
of our model would remain the same. At a more general level, understanding how the quality
upgrading of existing products interacts with the degree of inequality in society is an interesting
direction of future research.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Taking labor as the numeraire so that w(t) = A(t), we can rewrite marginal costs w(t)~ak(t) =
ak for k 2 fl; hg given spillovers. A mass producer selling the high quality to the rich and the
low quality to the poor faces the following prot maximization problem:
max
ph;pl
[L(1  )(ph   ah) + L(pl   al)] ;
s.t. (i) ph  qhR; (ii) pl  qlP ; (iii) qhR   ph  qlR   pl; and (iv) qlP   pl  qhP   ph;
The constraints are based on the rst-order conditions of households (2). (i) and (ii) ensure
that households purchase the good (rationality constraints), and (iii) and (iv) ensure that rich
households prefer to buy the high quality and poor the low (incentive constraints). Notice that
a rm cannot separate the rich into the low quality and the poor into the high given the higher
willingness to pay of the rich, R > P .
25
Constraint (iii) and R > P imply qhR  ph  qlR  pl > qlP   pl. Hence if constraint
(ii) were inactive, so would be (i). But then the rm could increase both prices by the same
amount without violating (iii) and (iv). Hence constraint (ii) must be active, qhR   ph 
qlR   pl > qlP   pl = 0, which implies that constraint (iii) must be active, too. Otherwise
the rm could increase the price of the high quality without violating constraints (iii) and (i).
Since constraint (iii) is active, qhR   ph = qlR   pl > qlP   pl = 0, constraint (i) cannot be
active. Rewritting the active constraint (iii), ph  pl = qhR   qlR > qhP   qlP shows that
constraint (iv) is not active as well. Hence constaints (ii) and (iii) are active, pl = qlP and
qhR   ph = qlR   pl, and a separating mass producer optimally sets prices pl = qlP and
ph = qlP + (qh   ql)R.
Recall that a mass producer has four other options besides separating the rich into the
high quality and the poor into the low (h; l): sell the high quality only to rich (h; 0) or to all
households (h; h), or sell the low quality only to rich (l; 0) or to all households (l; l). The ve
options yield the following prot ows:
h;0 = L(1  )(qhR   ah);
h;h = L(qhP   ah);
h;l = L(qlP   al) + L(1  )((qh   ql)R + qlP   ah); (19)
l;l = L(qlP   al);
l;0 = L(1  )(qlR   al):
It is easy to verify that if Assumption 1 holds, separating households (h; l) is an optimal
25 Incentive constraints of qlR   pl  qhR   ph and qhP   ph  qlP   pl would require (qh   ql)P 
ph   pl  (qh   ql)R, which cannot hold.
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strategy for mass producers. Condition (i) (qh   ql)R > ah   al ensures that selling the low
quality to all households (l; l) yields lower prots. Condition (iii) qlP   (1  ) qlR al  0
ensures that selling only the high quality to rich households (h; 0) yields equal or lower prots.
And since condition (ii) (1  ) (qhR   ah)  (qhP   ah) ensures that exclusive producers
(weakly) prefer selling the high quality only to rich households instead to all, selling the high
quality to all households (h; h) must generate lower prots for mass producers, as well. And
nally, condition (i) also ensures that selling the low quality only to rich households (l; 0) is
inferior (to selling the high quality only to rich households and thus to separating households).
Similarly for exclusive producers which can only supply the high quality, condition (ii) ensures
that selling only to rich households is an optimal strategy.
If conditions (ii) and (iii) in Assumption 1 hold with strict inequality, exclusive producers
sell only to the rich generating e = h;0, and mass producers separate households generating
m = h;l, proong part (a) of Proposition 1. When condition (ii) holds with equality, exclusive
rms are indi¤erent between selling only to rich and to all households, e = h;0 = h;h,
proong part (b). And when condition (iii) holds with equality, mass producers are indi¤erent
between selling only to rich and selling to all, separating households, m = e, proong part
(c).
If Assumption 1 does not hold, it might be more protable for exclusive producers to sell
the high quality to all households and/or for mass producers to sell only one quality either
only to rich or to all households. Appendix B takes into account the general equilibrium to
say more about the di¤erent outcomes.
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Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2
In a rst step we prove the following lemma stating the possible equilibrium outcomes:
Lemma 1 In a balanced growth equilibrium, four outcomes are possible: (1) some rms sell
the high quality only to rich while others the high quality to rich and the low quality to poor,
(2) some rms sell the high quality only to rich while others the low quality to all, (3) all rms
only sell the high quality, some only to rich while others to all, and (4) all rms only sell the
low quality, some only to rich while others to all.
Proof. In any equilibrium, among the ve options of rms (see Appendix A), two are
equilibrium strategies: some rms sell to all households since otherwise poor households would
consume nothing, and some rms sell only to rich households.26 This leaves six combinations
of two strategies of which two can be ruled out:
Compare prot ows (equations 19) to see that "(qh   ql)P > ah   al" =) "h;h >
l;l", "(qh   ql)R > ah   al" =) "h;0 > l;0" and "(qh   ql)R > ah   al" =) "h;l >
l;l". Since R > P , we have "h;h  l;l" =) "h;0 > l;0", "l;0  h;0" =) "l;l >
h;h", and "h;0 > l;0" () "h;l > l;l". Hence we can rule out outcomes where some
rms separate and other rms sell the low quality only to rich households. We can also
rule out outcomes where some rms sell the high quality to all households and other rms
the low quality only to rich households, which require l;0   h;0  l;l   h;h, implying
(qh ql)P [1=   (1  )P ==R]  ah al. But from above we know that "l;0  h;0" =)
"l;l > h;h", implying (qh   ql)P < ah   al, which contradicts the inequality in the previous
sentence, since the term in the square bracket is smaller than one (R > P , and  < 1).
Note that in any balanced growth equilibrium one of the four outcomes prevails. On
transitional equilibrium paths we have shown that, if m(t) is too low, three strategies co-exist
for general parameter values. Focusing on balanced growth paths, let us characterize these
four outcomes in more detail starting with the one of the main text proong Proposition 2.
A balanced growth equilibrium determined by (7) and (8) exists if Assumption 1 holds with
strict inequalities. From Proposition 1 we know that exclusive producers sell only to the rich
and mass producers separate households if Assumption 1 holds with strict inequalities. Hence
one needs to compute R and P for a given set of parameters, using equations (7) and (8)
and the expressions for prices of Section 4.3, and test whether Assumption 1 holds. If this
26Firms which sell to all households cannot charge the entire willingness to pay of the rich (even when
separating households they need to leave an "informational rent" to incentivize rich households to buy the high
quality). Hence rich would have no binding rst-order condition (i.e. would not exhaust their budgets) if all
rms sold to all households. We can rule out such equilibrium outcomes, since rich households would have an
innite willingness to pay and thus rms would have an incentive to sell only to rich households instead.
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is the case, no rm has an incentive to deviate, and the outcome is indeed an equilibrium.27
Computations have shown that Assumption 1 holds in a balanced growth equilibrium if the
quality gap qh   ql is su¢ ciently high relative to the cost gap ah   al and process innovation
costs G; and if inequality is su¢ ciently high, i.e. the group of poor  is su¢ ciently large as
well as  not too high. If Assumption 1 is violated, alternative outcomes prevail (see below).
In order to determine existence of a positive growth equilibrium, denote the horizontal
m-axis intercepts of the NA- and RC-curve as mNA and mRC (see Figure 4). If mRC < mNA
a positive balanced growth equilibrium must exist. The left hand side of (8) is increasing in
 for m < 1: Hence, the RC-curve shifts downwards when  decreases. Thus, mRC j >0 <
mRC j =0 = (1  )ah= (1  al), by using (8). Since (1  )ah= (1  al) < 1 (otherwise RC
and NA could not cross at m < 1 for  = 0 thereby violating assumption 1), the RC-curve (8)
is fullled for g > 0 if m = 1: We derive a su¢ cient condition for mRC < mNA
(1  )ah= (1  al) <
 (ql=qh + (1  )G=F + (1  ) [al   (1  )ahG=F ] = [F=L+ (1  )ah]) 1 = mNA:
Note further that the condition mRC < mNA trivially holds if the RC-curve has a vertical axis
intercept in the positive (m; g)-quadrant, which is true whenever  1= > (1  )ah:
The balanced growth equilibrium is necessarily unique if the NA-curve is upward sloping
(which holds true if al=(1   ) > ahG=F ). The NA-curve is always convex in m: To see
this, note that @2qhR=@m
2 = 2(1   ) [al=(1  )  ahG=F ] [=m  ] 3 > 0 with  
ql=qh + (1   )G=F . The denition of (6) requires that the nominator and the denominator
have the same sign such that qhR > 0. The RC-curve is concave when it is upward sloping,
this holds true as ( + (1   )m)1= is a concave function. Hence, the curves can cross only
once in only once in the positive (m; g)-quadrant as long as the horizontal m-axis intercept of
an upward sloping NA-curve lies to the right of the RC-curve. For mRC  mNA or a downward
sloping NA-curve, a positive growth equilibrium exists as well but it is not necessarily unique.
Alternative equilibrium outcomes When one of the conditions in Assumption 1 is
violated, alternative outcomes will arise. We briey discuss these outcomes. First, mass
producers may supply only the low quality to both poor and rich households while exclusive
producers sell only to the rich. Along the lines of the main text, we can derive prices, a
27Furthermore, one can show that the equilibrium is unique by checking that rms have incentives to deviate
in every alternative equilibrium outcome (see below).
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no-arbitrage curve and a resource curve, respectively, for such an outcome,
pl = qlP = (1 +G=F )(1  ) (qhR   ah) + al;
pe = qhR =
al   (1 +G=F )(1  )ah
(1=m  1) = ((m)  1)  (1  )(1 +G=F ) ;
g =
L(1  )
F

al   (1 +G=F )(1  )ah
(1=m  1) = ((m)  1)  (1  )(1 +G=F )   ah

  ;
g =
L
h
( + (1   )m)1=   (1 m)(1  )ah  mal
i
F +Gm
:
This outcome is qualitatively similar to the one we focus on with one di¤erence: Even in the
case of A(t) = N(t), i.e.  = 1, inequality may be harmful for growth. For a su¢ ciently small
al, the resource curve may be increasing in m. An increase in the fraction of mass producers
m may set free resources for product R&D, as mass producers only use the less laborious
process. Even though more goods are produced, less production labor is needed. If al is not
su¢ ciently small, the results are analogous to the main text. The conditions for this case are
that exclusive producers prefer selling only to rich, (1   )(qhR   ah) > (qhP   ah), and
mass producers prefer selling the low quality to all households, ah   al > (qh   ql)R and
(qlP   al) > (1  )(qlR   al).
Second, if process innovation costs are too high, no rm invests in mass production and
rms either sell to rich or to all households. Such an outcome corresponds to the initial stage in
Section 6.2, and the equilibrium is characterized by the equations presented there. Recall that
in this equilibrium outcome, inequality unambiguously is benecial for growth as the resource
curve is downward sloping in nP given the absence of process innovation. Process innovation
costs are too high if G > max(h;l= (g + )  F; l;l= (g + )  F; l;0= (g + )  F ).
Third, the last outcome arises in the opposite case where the mass production technology
is too attractive. The resulting outcome is qualitatively equivalent to the previous one (initial
stage in Section 6.2), substituting (F +G; al; ql; (0); 1) for

F; ah; qh; (1);  
1=

, and arises if
F > max(h;0= (g + ) ; h;h= (g + )) and ah   al > (qh   ql)R, that is if process innovation
costs G are su¢ ciently low, and the quality gap qh  ql relatively low compared to the cost gap
ah   al. Also in this equilibrium outcome, inequality is unambiguously benecial for growth
as the resource curve is downward sloping since all rms, even the one only selling to rich
households, invest in the low-quality process innovation, m = 1.
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Appendix C: Product cycles
Given the symmetry in preferences and technology in our model, rms are indi¤erent about
the timing of process innovation as discussed in the section on R&D. The individual product
cycle is indeterminate. There are two natural extensions to our model, either adjusting pref-
erences or technology, which break this symmetry and thus replicate the empirically observed
product cycles.
Hierarchic preferences Both intuitively and empirically, it makes sense that there is a
hierarchy of needs as opposed to the symmetric preferences of the main model. Certain more
basic goods have priority:
u(t) =
Z N(t)
0
(j)x(j; t)q(j; t)dj;
where we have added a hierarchy weight (j) to felicity which is strictly monotonically decreas-
ing in j. Hence low-j goods get a higher weight than high-j goods, and thus households have
a higher willingness to pay for low-j than for high-j goods. Product innovation R&D would
focus on the lowest-j goods not yet invented. For balanced growth, the hierarchy weight needs
to be a power function, (j) = j  (see Bertola, Foellmi, and Zweimüller, 2006, Chapter 12).
The process innovation timing problem becomes:
max

V (j; t) =
Z t+
t
e(j; s) exp( rs)ds+
Z 1
t+
m(j; s) exp( rs)ds G exp( r);
e(j; s) = L (1  )

j qhR(s)  ah

;
m(j; s) = L


 
j qlP (s)  al

+ (1  )  j  ((qh   ql)R(s) + qlP (s))  ah :
Prot ows depend on hierarchy levels and on time, as R(t) and P (t) are increasing at
rate g.28 Hence, the di¤erence between prot ows from mass and exclusive strategies
grows.29 In equilibrium, rms start out being exclusive producers. As the di¤erence nar-
rows to m(j; s)   e(j; s) = G, it becomes optimal for rms to switch to mass strategy, 
units of time after product innovation (using Leibniz rule). The size makes low-j goods more
attractive to sell in mass consumption markets than high-j goods. Note that if we let  ! 0,
the hierarchic preferences formulation converges to the symmetric case of the main text but
with a determinate product cycle.
28 In order that the no-arbitrage condition holds, the initial present value of every newly set up rm must
equal F . Hence the hierarchy-independent part of the willingness-to-pay i(t) must rise at  @=@t
 
j 

= g
over time, in order that the overall willingness to pay for a good only depends on the time span since inception,
and not on time.
29The revenues of mass producers must be higher in equilibrium. Otherwise, rms would never switch to
mass strategies given process innovation costs. Note also that both revenue streams grow at the same rate. It
follows that m(j; s)  e(j; s) grows over time.
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Hierarchic preferences generate a product cycle where rms initially sell goods exclusively
to rich households given their high willingness to pay for new goods even if they are low on
their priority list. After a certain period of time, rms invest in process innovation to tap
mass consumption markets as their goods have climbed the relative hierarchic ladder, being
transformed from luxuries into necessities.
Learning-by-doing Process innovation costs G(t) are likely to di¤er across rms, and
decrease with individual manufacturing experience, in contrast to the main model. Individual
learning-by-doing lowers G(j; t). In fact, instead of modelling process innovation as an inten-
tional investment of G(j; t) depending on manufacturing experience, it is instructive to analyze
the case of process innovation as a pure (passive) by-product of manufacturing:
a(j; t) = (1  (j; t))a=N(t); (j; t) =
Z t
 1
x(j; s) exp( (t  s))ds;
where  is the speed of learning as well as the depreciation rate of learning capital, and a(j; t)
and x(j; s) productivity and production level of rm j (see Matsuyama, 2002). Further let us
assume that there is only one quality level, q = 1. Individual productivity of a rm increases
due to individual cumulative manufacturing experience, as well as through spillovers from
product innovation. In equilibrium, mass consumption markets are more attractive for higher
productivity levels due to market size e¤ects. Hence rms start out exclusively producing for
rich households, and eventually become producers for the mass markets, after a determined
time interval :
max

Z 
0
(1  )L [ph   (1  (j; t))] exp( rt)dt+
Z 1

L [pl   (1  (j; t))] exp( rt)dt = F=a;
where ph is the price charged by "exclusive producers", and pl by "mass producers", and we set
w(t) = N(t)=a (numéraire). The maximized present value needs to be equal to set-up costs,
~F (t)w(t) = F=a (given spillovers ~F (t) = F=N(t)), generating a no-arbitrage condition. The
optimal period of time  for being an exclusive producer is determined by pl = (1   )ph +
 [1  L(1  ) [1  exp( )]  L=(r + )],30 and the fraction of mass producers by :
m = 1 
Z 0
 
gN(0) exp(gt)dt=N(0) = exp( g):
The equilibrium can be analyzed by combining these equations with the Euler equation (4) and
the relative budget constraint, which in this case is (m) = ((1 m)ph +mpl) =mpl, to form
a no-arbitrage curve in m and g, as above. The resource curve is determined by the resource
constraint:
L = gF +
aL
N(t)
"Z mN(t)
0
(1  (j; t))dj + (1  )
Z N(t)
mN(t)
(1  (j; t))dj
#
:
30Use Leibniz rule and the fact that (j; t) = L(1 ) [1  exp( t)] if t  t, and (j; t) = L [1  exp( t)] 
L [exp( (t t)  exp( t)] if t > t.
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Computations show that the resource curve may be rising or falling in m, depending on
the strength of learning-by-doing (LBD). Raising inequality, decreasing , increases prices and
decreases mass consumption markets, m, which tends to reduce resources required in manufac-
turing. However, by lowering aggregate manufacturing, economy-wide LBD is reduced. Either
e¤ect may dominate. Inequality hurts growth if LBD is the dominant driver of productivity
growth in the economy, otherwise inequality is benecial for growth. Hence, our results hold
also in the case of the continuous LBD process innovation.
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Appendix D: Transitional dynamics
When the economy operates o¤ the balanced growth path, there are either only product
innovations or only process innovations but not both:
Proof of Proposition 4 Suppose the economy is in an equilibrium but not necessary
the steady state where both product and process innovation occur. Since VN (t) = F and
VM (t) = G hold, the instantaneous interest rate is given by
r(t) = L [qlP (t)  (1  )qlR(t)  al] =G = (1  )L(qhR(t)  ah)=F: (20)
The Euler equations of rich and poor, and the resource constraint read
_R(t)=R(t) = r(t)    _N(t)=N(t); _P (t)=P (t) = r(t)    _M(t)=M(t);
_M(t)G+ _N(t)F = L ( N(t) + (1   )M(t))1=   LM(t)al   L(1  )N(t)ah:
We reduce this system of di¤erential equations to get a single equation in R(t) andM(t)=N(t).
Rewrite the resource constraint
_M(t)
M(t)
M(t)
N(t)
G+
_N(t)
N(t)
F = L

 + (1   )

M(t)
N(t)
1=
 LM(t)
N(t)
al L(1 )ah  

M(t)
N(t)

Rearranging (20) we get qlP (t) = (1  ) (ql + qhG=F )R(t) + al   (1  )ahG=F: We take
the derivative and insert this into the Euler equation of the poor to get
_R(t)
R(t) + [al   (1  )ahG=F ] = [(1  ) (ql + qhG=F )]
=
(1  )L
F
(qhR(t)  ah)   

M(t)
N(t)
G
 1 


M(t)
N(t)

 
_N(t)
N(t)
F
!
;
and use the Euler equation of the rich to form
_R(t)
R(t) + [al   (1  )ahG=F ] = [(1  ) (ql + qhG=F )]
+
_R(t)
R(t)
F
GM(t)=N(t)
=
(1  )L
F
(qhR(t)  ah)   

M(t)
N(t)
G
 1


M(t)
N(t)

  (1  )L(qhR(t)  ah) + F

:
We see that _R(t) is monotonically increasing in R(t). Denote the steady state level of R(t)
by SSR . Therefore, if R(t) > (<)
SS
R , R(t) will grow (fall) without bound. Hence, there
is only one equilibrium: R(t) must immediately adjust to 
SS
R . As P (t) and R(t) are
monotonically related through (20) the analoguous holds true for P (t) as well. We conclude
that in the presence of both process and product innovations the economy is in steady state.
Hence, a change in parameter values leading to a balanced growth equilibrium with a
higher m =M(t)=N(t) and where Assumption 1 holds, triggers a sequence of adjustment with
at most two phases with only process innovations and no product innovations. If the variety
of consumption of the poor jumps to NP (t0) > M(t0) after a shock (which is necessarily the
case if M(t0) = 0), the economy enters phase 1:
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Phase 1 (t0; t1) The laws of motion governing the initial phase (equations 13-17) are
repeated and simplied here for convenience:
_R(t)=R(t) = r1   ;
_P (t)=P (t) = r1    
h
_M(t)ql +

_NP (t)  _M(t)

qh
i
= [M(t)ql + (NP (t) M(t)) qh] ;
_M(t)G=L = A(N(t0);M(t))   [M(t)al + (NP (t) M(t))ah]  (1  )N(t0)ah;
and _N(t) = 0, with r1 = [ql=qh   al=ah]Lah=G, and P (t) = (1  )R(t) + ah=qh.
Moreover, we have initial values for the state variables, N(t0) > 0, and M(t0)  0. The
equal-prot and transversality conditions for rich and poor households x initial values for
the costate variables, R(t0) and P (t0) (and NP (t0)). Numerically, we solve the system by
backward integration starting in the nal balanced growth equilibrium and letting time run
backward. Initial values of costate variables thus can be xed by using nal balanced growth
equilibrium values as boundary conditions.
Since prices of mass and exclusive goods evolve di¤erently, wealth inequality, v(t), changes
during the transition,
_vR(t) = r1vR(t) + (1  `)=(1  )A(N(t0);M(t))  [N(t0) NP (t)] qhR(t) 
[NP (t) M(t)] qhP (t) M(t) [(qh   ql)R(t) + qlP (t)] ;
_vP (t) = r1vP (t) + `A(N(t0);M(t))  [NP (t) M(t)] qhP (t) M(t)qlP (t):
Initial wealth inequality can be xed using nal values as boundary conditions if we know
nal wealth inequality, 0v. If we know initial wealth inequality instead, v(t0), we guess nal
wealth inequality, shoot backward, and check whether the resulting initial wealth inequality
corresponds to the true value. This process is reiterated with new guesses until a su¢ ciently
close value is found (see below).
Finally, the economy exits phase 1 and enters phase 2 as soon as NP (t) =M(t).
Phase 2 [t1; t2) If all mass producers have invested in process innovation, NP (t) =M(t),
we need to adjust the laws of motion as follows:
_R(t)=R(t) = r(t)  ;
_P (t)=P (t) = r(t)    _M(t)=M(t);
_M(t)G=L = A(N(t0);M(t))  M(t)al   (1  )N(t0)ah;
and _N(t) = 0, with r(t) = [qlP (t)  (1  )qlR(t)  al]L=G. Since all mass producers have
innovated, the equal prots equation does not need to hold anymore, and interest rates are no
longer constant. Initial values of state variables are given by the values at the end of phase 1,
44
N(t0) andM(t1). Final conditions using backward integration x the level of costate variables,
R(t) and P (t). Wealth accumulation is
_vR(t) = r(t)vR(t) + (1  `)=(1  )A(N(t0);M(t)) 
[N(t0) M(t)] qhR(t) M(t) [(qh   ql)R(t) + qlP (t)] ;
_vP (t) = r(t)vP (t) + `A(N(t0);M(t)) M(t)qlP (t):
The economy exits phase 2 once product innovation becomes attractive again, r(t)F = (1  
)L(qhR(t)  ah), and enters the new balanced growth equilibrium (given Proposition 4).
Note that an economy never skips phase 2 in a transition to a higher m0, directly entering
the new balanced growth path after phase 1 (i.e. every such transition contains phase 2). Since
in phase 1, exclusive producers make equal prots selling only to rich or to all households, and
this is not the case in the nal steady state (given Assumption 1 with strict inequalities),
there needs to be a phase where prices adjust accordingly (as costate variables cannot jump
expectedly).
A note on stability Finally, transitional dynamics and numerical simulations allow us
to analyze the stability of the balanced growth equilibrium of Section 5. For most parameter
values, the equilibrium is globally saddle path stable.31 If the economy starts with a too low m,
we enter a transitional phase characterized above with no product innovation and only process
innovation. In contrast, if the economy starts with a too high m, mutatis mutandis, society
goes through a phase without process innovations and only product innovations, reaching the
balanced growth equilibrium in nite time (with an initial phase where mass and exclusive
producers earn equal prot ows, and some mass producers do not use the mass production
process and only sell the high quality to rich households).
Some notes on the numerical simulation procedure
"[F]or yourself, sir, shall grow old as I am, if like a crab you could go backward."
Hamlet to Polonius, William Shakespeare, Hamlet, 2.2,200-201
We use backward integration (Brunner and Strulik, 2002) to tackle transitional dynamics,
analyzing the dynamic system numerically with the Mathematica procedure "NDSolve". How-
ever, since transition is nite and has di¤erent phases, we need to make adjustments to the
standard procedure. Let us briey outline the key steps:
1. We start by solving the nal and the initial balanced growth equilibrium.
31For some special parameter values there are multiple balanced growth equilibria with a high and an inter-
mediate growth equilibrium which is unstable.
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2. Using the di¤erential equations derived above, we let time run backward by multiplying the
right-hand side of the ordinary di¤erential equation system with the scalar ( 1).
3. Hence, we start in phase 2, solve for the path of state and costate variables, then solve phase 1,
using "NDSolve".
4. To determine at what point the economy switches to the preceding phase we keep track of the
no-arbitrage conditions. As an example, going backward in phase 2, as soon as the mass high
strategy becomes attractive, we have reached the start of phase 2, and thus the end of phase 1.
The values of state/co-state variables at the calculated point of time serve as ending values for
the preceding phase.
5. If we are in phase 1, time running backwards, as soon as m(t) hits the initial value, we know
that we are at the time of the shock, t0.
6. Having programed all phases, we need to take the nal balanced growth equilibrium state/co-
state variables and let time run backward. Note that since in our model the transition period
is nite, we do not need to perturb nal balanced growth path values slightly as would be the
case in the standard procedure if convergence were asymptotic. We simply need to start with the
dynamic system of phase 2 using the exact values of the nal balanced growth path variables.
7. If we know nal wealth inequality 0v, we can track wealth levels backward (using the wealth
accumulation equations), computing v at time t0. If we know initial wealth inequality 
0
v(t0)
instead, we must guess nal wealth inequality, shoot backward, and check whether the resulting
initial wealth inequality corresponds to the true value. This process must be reiterated with new
guesses until one is su¢ ciently close to the true value.
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Figure 3: Market demand for high and for low quality
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Figure 9: Positive productivity shock
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